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Abstract
This paper draws on agency theory, as extended by the
social theory of agency (STA) (Wiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez
& Gomez-Mejia, 2012), to examine the association between
governance arrangements, reliance on government fund-
ing, chief executive officer (CEO) non-profit experience, and
CEO compensation in the UK charity sector. We rely on
a hand-collected data for the largest 240 charities and
find that greater trustee board diversity (specifically gen-
der and education diversity) and the existence of a remu-
neration or nomination committee are positively associated
to CEO compensation. The results also show that a reliance
on government funding and CEO’s non-profit work expe-
rience, together with the presence of a finance/accounting
expert on the audit committee are negatively associated
to CEO compensation. The existence of an audit commit-
tee, internal audit function, use of specialist external audi-
tor and CEO characteristics (gender, ethnicity and manage-
rial experience) are not significant factors. Our findings are
largely consistent with the STA’s propositions. Specifically,
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executive compensation levels reflect the CEO’s ability to
work with a diverse board while a higher reliance on gov-
ernment funding signals the role of the State’s pressures in
moderating CEO compensation. Finally, in a context charac-
terised by altruism and public benefit, financial rewards are
not seen as the dominant ‘value metric’, resulting in lower
compensation for CEOs previously working in the sector.
Our findings have policy implications, specifically in relation
to the role, composition and effectiveness of governance
structures (e.g., trusteeboards, audit and remuneration com-
mittees) in overseeing the design of executive compensation
schemes within the charity sector.
KEYWORDS
board diversity, CEO characteristics, CEO compensation, charity
governance, social theory of agency
1 INTRODUCTION
The question of whether non-profit executive compensation is fairly and appropriately structured has received some
attention in both public and regulatory1 circles (Newton, 2015; Perego & Verbeeten, 2015), following concerns in
recent years about relatively high compensation awarded to executives (Third Sector, 2015). For exampleHope (2013)
is critical about the marked increase in U.K. chief executive officer (CEO) pay and he echoes a call from the regu-
lator (Charity Commission) to charity leaders to explain and justify these changes in compensation. Similar circum-
stances, mainly in U.S. settings, have already led to studies examining the determinants of non-profit CEO compensa-
tion, thereby highlighting the relevance of key factors such as CEO profiles (e.g. experience and age), quality of gov-
ernance, organisational performance and characteristics (Allen &McAllister, 2018; Newton, 2015). However, outside
of the U.S. context, research findings are limited. In the U.K. case, a number of reforms have been initiated in 2005
(and in 2010) to review the composition of trustee boards and strengthen other monitoring mechanisms (e.g. audit
committee, remuneration/nomination committee and internal audit), amidst societal concerns about charity account-
ability and a reliance on government funding (Connolly & Hyndman, 2013; Dhanani, 2009; Hyndman & McDonnell,
2009). Yet, little is known about the influence of trustee board composition (diversity), monitoring mechanisms and
reliance on government funding alongside other organisational and CEO characteristics (Ballantine, Forker, & Green-
wood, 2008; Elmagrhi, Ntim, Malagila, Fosu, & Tunyi, 2018; Jobome, 2006). Furthermore, an anecdotal examination
of charity annual reports (e.g. Cancer Research UK, Oxfam and Charities Aid Foundation) shows limited disclosure
about how executive remuneration is determined; even in cases where a remuneration committee was established.
We therefore consider these largely unexplored issues by addressing the following research question: ‘Towhat extent
do trustee board diversity, monitoring mechanisms, government funding and CEO characteristics influence the level
of CEO compensation in UK charities’?2
1 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11435754/32-charity-bosses-paid-over-200000-last-year.html
2 Terminology-wise, a non-profit organisation (NPO) is an organisation which does not have shareholders and cannot distribute its surplus to fund providers
or to owners. A U.K. charity is a NPO that has to meet a strict criteria set out by authorities regarding its ‘public benefit’ purpose, governance and financial
accountability.
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Following previous studies examining the determinants of non-profit compensation (Ballantine et al.,
2008; Newton, 2015; Perego & Verbeeten, 2015), we rely on agency theory (Fama & Jensen, 1983). At the
same time, we contend that these studies tend to frame agency theory in a ‘classical’ form, namely that
agents ‘will’ behave opportunistically as a result of their wealth-maximisation motive and conflict of inter-
ests and information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. Thus, governance and other monitor-
ing structures are typically enacted to mitigate agential behaviour and CEO compensation. Whether such
a characterisation fully applies to the charitable sector is open to question, in light of different (and poten-
tially non-pecuniary) motivations associated to charity leaders, the existence of a multiplicity of stakeholder
interests or principals (Jobome, 2006; Van Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois, & Jegers, 2011; Wellens & Jegers,
2014) and the need for trustees to balance their advisory and strategizing roles (Parker, 2007) with their moni-
toring responsibilities. These points underline the relevance of the social and institutional context in which executives
and trustees operate and interact – including onmatters relating to executive compensation. Consequently, we extend
the agency perspective by drawing uponWiseman, Cuevas-Rodríguez, andGomez-Mejia (2012) insights on the ‘social
theory of agency’ (STA). Distinctively, STA argues that agential behaviour and interests ‘may’ vary in a principal–agent
setting and such behaviour/interest is mediated by factors associated to the institutional environment, cognitive
framework and power relations in a given context (e.g. U.K. charity sector). This perspective is pertinent to the case
of executive compensation because it is argued that managers may be driven by altruism and notions of public benefit
(Jobome, 2006), whereas stakeholders and trustees are primarily involved on the basis of the charity delivering social
objectives/outcomes, rather than purely economic ones (Van Puyvelde et al., 2011;Wellens & Jegers, 2014).
Based on hand-collected data from the top 240 U.K. charities, we examine the relationship between CEO com-
pensation and different facets of charity governance (trustee diversity, audit committee, remuneration committee,
internal audit function and external auditor), reliance on government funding and CEO characteristics (i.e., gen-
der, ethnicity and experience). We find the CEO compensation is positively associated to trustee board gender and
educational diversity and the existence of a remuneration or nomination committee. However, the presence of a
finance/accounting expert on the audit committee is negatively associated to CEO compensation. We also find that
government funding and CEO non-profit work experience are negatively associated to executive compensation.
Finally, charity size is positively associated whilst none of the measures of charity (financial) performance are asso-
ciatedwith compensation. Overall, and in line with STA expectations, executive compensation levels reflect the CEO’s
ability to work with a diverse board, whereas a higher reliance on government funding signals the role of the State
in moderating CEO compensation. Furthermore, in a context characterised by altruism and public benefit, financial
rewards are not seen as the dominant ‘valuemetric’ resulting in lower compensation for CEOswho haveworked in the
sector.
This research contributes to the literature by providing evidence about the determinants of charity CEO com-
pensation in the UK, particularly in terms of the divergent role (negative and positive) of mainstream governance
and other monitoring mechanisms enacted in the light of reforms highlighted earlier, the implications of govern-
ment funding and CEO charity experience. Contrastingly, prior works (Jobome, 2006; Newton, 2015) only found
mixed results on the role of governance arrangements in constraining CEO compensation and have tended to
rely on a limited number of governance proxies (e.g. board size, the existence of sub-committees and board inde-
pendence). Relatedly, Allen and McAllister (2018) concluded that conflicting pay–performance evidence in the
non-profit context (e.g., U.S. foundations) may be ‘indicative of unobservable board governance mechanisms that
impact both CEO compensation and performance’ (p. 128). Our findings thus bring new insights on the granu-
lar effects of these ‘unobservable’ mechanisms (e.g. board diversity and monitoring mechanisms) as informed by
the role of social/cultural and institutional conditions underpinning ‘principal(s)–agent’ relations. We now expand
on the literature review, theory, hypothesis development, methodology, findings and analysis and concluding
implications.
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Theoretical framework: Social theory of agency
Wiseman et al. (2012) contend that the principal–agent relationship should not be merely seen (and operationalised)
as a set of narrow and calculative exchanges between two inherently distrustful parties. Instead, in any situation
involving delegation, conflict of interests between agent and principal(s) is ‘always a possibility because these par-
ties may hold contrasting views about desired objectives and means–ends relations, potentially leading to actions on
the part of the agent that are inconsistent with the principal’s desires’ (Wiseman et al., 2012, p. 204). Equally there-
fore, both parties can have converging interests that may or may not be driven by wealth maximisation objectives.
Furthermore, due to the inherent existence of information asymmetry between principal(s) and agent, each partymay
struggle to understand whether their respective interests are aligned or not to each other. An agent may also commit
to a course of action that he or she deems best for the organisation that might be at odds with the principal’s expecta-
tions. This gives rise to a range of possibilities about the role of governance andother reforms associated to the control
of executive decisions (including compensation).
Wiseman et al. (2012) also contend that principal–agent interactions are shaped by four ‘social mechanisms’,
namely institutional environment, cognitive framework, social networks and power relations. Briefly, institutional
environment refers to the State’s infrastructure and policies that promotemarkets and economic transactions (‘trans-
parency intermediation’), for example bymandating the publication of audited financial statements (e.g. by theCharity
Commission) to address information asymmetry and codes of governance tomonitor and protect contractual arrange-
ments (e.g. guidance on charity board composition by the Code Steering Group, 2010). The State has also the power
to intervene and regulate economic exchanges, discourage socially undesirable behaviour and limit the agent’s field
of manoeuver (‘political intervention’) through ownership and board ties, for example, establishing rules for fund-
ing/grants and bidding on project costing for charities seeking to provide outsourced public services. The ‘cognitive
framework’ considers how societies and cultures conceive of the role and exercise of power of individual leadership.
In this regard, certain cultures consider pecuniary rewards to be a crucial form of social comparison (i.e. income is a
suitable ‘value-metric’), whereas in other contexts, high pay differentials are not socially acceptable and instead, there
is a preference for non-pecuniary metrics (e.g. honorary titles, awards for service to the community) as the preferred
‘value-metric’. Indeed, Jobome (2006) does allude to an altruism factor in relation to charity executive compensation
while the Charity Commission requires all charities need to abide by their ‘public benefit’ statement to maintain their
registration and that trustees should discharge their role on an unpaid basis (Charity Commission, 2004).
In addition, ‘social networks’ emphasise the inter-linkages between principals or agents and their wider network
(e.g. professional and cultural networks and board memberships), and how a network can help reduce information
asymmetry and nudge agents, through social pressure, to refrain from opportunistic behaviours. For example, sev-
eral best practice statements in the U.K. sector have been issued by the National Council for Voluntary Organisations
(NCVO), a network of charity CEOs. Finally, ‘power relations’ articulate how and why principals exercise influence via
governance structures due to ‘ownership concentration’ and by virtue of their role as stakeholder or societal represen-
tatives (‘diversity of principals’ and ‘family influence’). For example this can arise in the case a charity receives funding
from different donors/stakeholders under certain conditions and/or faces pressure to meet their multiple expecta-
tions. In conclusion, Wiseman et al. (2012, p. 215)3 formulate seven propositions on how principal–agent relations
might vary within different contexts or arrangements, and how this might affect agential performance, governance
arrangements and rewards/compensation. We draw on several of these propositions to develop specific hypotheses
for our study.
3 For brevity, the full list ofWiseman et al.’s (2012) propositions is not provided.We also do not rely on the ‘social networks’ dimension due to the challenges
in ascertaining the extent of trustee social networks in U.K. charities.
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2.2 Trustee board diversity and CEO compensation
The board of trustees has important strategizing and monitoring roles (Buse, Bernstein, & Bilimoria, 2016; Callen,
Klein, & Tinkelman, 2003). In line with mainstream corporate governance thinking, U.K. charity boards have to con-
sider appointing trustees who can provide a combination of skills, experience, knowledge and backgrounds (Code
Steering Group, 2010). There is a normative expectation of the ‘beneficial’ impact of a diverse (heterogeneous) board
when charities recognise and seek the involvement of a number of stakeholders and resource providers, for example
employees anddonors, volunteers, beneficiaries, government and regulators (Connolly,Hyndman,&Mcconville, 2013;
Van Puyvelde et al., 2011). However, prior evidence on the different facets of boardroom diversity (gender, education,
experience and age) points tomuch debate about their actual effectiveness and consequences (e.g. Aggarwal, Evans, &
Nanda, 2012; Ballantine et al., 2008; Elmagrhi et al., 2018;Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, &Hanuman, 2012;Newton, 2015).4
This issue is equally noticeable in the for-profit context (e.g. Benkraiem, Hamrouni, Lakhal, & Toumi, 2017; Sarhan,
Ntim, & Al-Najjar, 2019). Some studies do claim that a heterogeneous board is associated to better decision-making,
a comprehensive appreciation of different risks (Murray, 1989; Tuggle, Schnatterly, & Johnson, 2010) and the con-
straining of CEOcompensation. Relatedly, Aggarwal et al. (2012) found that non-profit board size is negatively related
to the level of mangerial incentives but Barros and Nunes (2007) found the reverse in the case of Portuguese non-
profit organisations (NPOs). Newton (2015) also found that CEO compensation is adversely associated to governance
quality (incorporating aspects of board composition), whereas Jobome (2006) did not find any significant association
betweenboard size and compensation for largeU.K. charities. In spite of these studies, evidence is scantwhen it comes
to the implications of board diversity and CEO compensation in the non-profit context.
In the non-profit context, a trustee board represents the concerns of multiple stakeholders (principals) with vary-
ing interests and contributes to the development of organisational strategy, and in turn, the pursuit of various objec-
tives influences the nature of commitments among the principals, trustee board and executives (Aggarwal et al., 2012).
According to the ‘power relations’ dimension of STA, there is an inherent tension in themanagement of heterogeneous
principals, which requires managers to balance their response and responsibilities towards different powerful stake-
holders and trustees. In this respect, there are challenges in finding a common ground (including on agreed notions
of performance and ‘success’, and how which strategies to implement) that would address the needs of all principals
(Wiseman et al., 2012). In a similar vein, the existence of a diversity of board members and principals can lead to con-
flicts, that may increase levels of information asymmetry among board members, principals and management team
(agents), thus requiringmore coordination and information sharing efforts by the agent (Wiseman et al., 2012).
In the context ofU.K. charities, trustees areultimately responsible for setting compensation levels for charity senior
staff. The payment is expected to be based on multiple criteria, for example in relation to meeting the purposes, aims
and values of the charity, the skills, experience and competence needed by the charity (NCVO, 2014). On the one
hand, a diverse boardmay encompassmemberswho are, on balance, better informed andmore capable tomake these
assessments. On the other hand, the existence of a diverse board may lead to a contradiction of priorities and prefer-
ences in the operation of the charity. The level of executive compensation may consequently be influenced by these
different preferences. The agent may also need to engage in activities to ‘identify and enforce political compromises
among principals with conflicting objectives’ (Wiseman et al., 2012, p. 215). As a result, the agency ‘costs’ we conceive
of in this particular context arise from a relative ‘absence’ of ingredients associated to a ‘homogeneous’ board (e.g.
cohesion, inter-personal communication and commonality of values), thus requiring more efforts from the agent. We
hence adopt Wiseman et al. (2012) proposition that the greater the number of diverse trustees and principals,5 the
4 We acknowledge that there is literature studying each of the specific facets of diversity (particularly gender diversity). At the same time, STA focuses on
the ‘diversity of principals’ as a broader theoretical construct which we adopt in our hypothesis development and we refer to the relevant literature in the
discussion of the findings.
5 Wiseman et al. (2012) do not specifically address the different facets of diversity as researched in the governance literature. From the STA’s perspective,
the heterogeneity of principals (e.g. by way of age, background, education and gender/ethnicity) implies a similar degree of challenge, power differentials and
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more likely that the agent will be rewarded according to their ability to reduce conflicts between, and satisfy multiple
and diverse principals. Hence, we hypothesise:
H1: Charity board diversity is positively associated to CEO compensation.
2.3 Monitoring mechanisms and CEO compensation
In this study, we use the term ‘monitoringmechanisms’ to indicate governance and control structures (excluding board
composition and trustee board diversity), namely the presence of sub-committees (audit committee, nomination com-
mittee and remuneration committee), the involvement of a finance/accounting expert in the audit committee, the exis-
tenceof an internal audit function and theappointmentof a specialist external auditor. Anumberof studies haveexam-
ined the role of governance mechanisms in determining CEO compensation (Barros & Nunes;, 2007; Conyon & He,
2012). However, the impact of these mechanisms on non-profit CEO compensation remains debatable. For example
Jobome (2006) did not find that the presence of an audit committee was associated with CEO compensation. Con-
trastingly, Perego and Verbeeten (2015) suggest that the adoption of a good governance code and the presence of a
Big 4 auditor is associated with lower managerial pay. Newton (2015) also found support for the role of governance
mechanisms inmitigating high level of executive pay in the U.S. non-profit sector.
According to Wiseman et al. (2012), political institutions (i.e. government and its agencies) seek to promote eco-
nomic exchanges by laying out a regulatory framework to enable transparency and to ensure transacting parties can
confidently engage in contractual arrangements. In particular, the state’s institutional environment establishes or sup-
ports an ‘infrastructure of intermediation that increases the transparency of economic transactions’ (Wiseman et al.,
2012, p. 208) to protect societal actors. Examples of such an infrastructure are a requirement to publish financial
reports, adoption of accounting standards and compliancewith governance/ethical rules to ensure organisational pro-
bity and integrity. Wiseman et al. (2012) argue that these rules help reduce information asymmetry experienced by
principals and foster stewardship behaviours amongst agents. Consequently, ‘the higher the level of intermediation
and transparency, the less likely agents will act opportunistically. . . and the greater the role of independent observers
in appraising and rewarding agents’ performance’ (Wiseman et al., 2012, p. 215). In the U.K. context, financial trans-
parency and the governance of charities have been the subject of attention by regulators in relation to accounting
rules (i.e., Statement of Recommended Practice) (Charity Commission, 2004; Hyndman & McMahon, 2010), code of
governance (CodeSteeringGroup, 2010), internal controls andexternal audit (CharityCommission, 2005, 2012, 2013,
2014). Specifically, the code recommended the establishment of remuneration, nomination and audit committees and
the appointment of specialists to oversee financial controls and practices, including executive remuneration.
Our interpretation from the perspective of STA is that the application of the above-mentioned mechanisms pro-
vides the necessary process and structures to monitor the level of compensation for executives (as in Perego & Ver-
beeten, 2015) and help address the criticisms from the public and media on U.K. charity CEO compensation. Further-
more, given themixed results on the role ofmonitoringmechanisms inmitigatingCEOcompensation in the charity sec-
tor, we argue, in linewith STA, thatmonitoringmechanismsmandated as part of the 2005/2010U.K. reforms reflected
a heightened institutional focus on charity accountability. This created a ‘fishbowl-like’ environment (Wiseman et al.,
2012, p. 208) involving more detailed transparency and scrutiny, in which agents become less incentivised to engage
in self-serving strategies, for example seeking higher executive compensation. Hence, we hypothesise:
H2: A higher extent of monitoringmechanisms is negatively associated to CEO compensation.
‘conflict’ in finding common ground. This explains our overall hypothesis, althoughwe do disaggregate the influence of the different aspects of board diversity
in the empirical analysis.
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2.4 Government funding and CEO compensation
U.K. charities receive significant funding from central, local and international governments. According to Keen and
Audickas (2015), government sources accounted for more than 30% of total income of the U.K. voluntary sector
between 2014 and 2015. This illustrates the crucial influence of the State, particularly as a result of the U.K. gov-
ernment’s policy to contract out a significant part of public services to charities (Hyndman & McMahon, 2011). In
addition to its role in the institutional environment, the State also engages in policy interventions that can limit (pro-
mote) economic exchanges that are deemed to be socially undesirable (acceptable). Therefore, political institutions
intervene in economic exchanges by regulating organisational and agential behaviour on the basis of ownership, board
representation or grant funding conditions. In such cases, the agent’s ability to meet the expectations of other stake-
holders/principals or to engage in opportunistic behaviours becomes limited given the prominence of the State as a
powerful stakeholder (Wiseman et al., 2012). A well-established literature certainly finds that political interventions
constrain managerial decision-making and behaviours (e.g. Okhmatovskiy, 2010) but less so in relation to CEO com-
pensation (Verbruggen & Christiaens, 2012). We argue that a reliance on U.K. government funding tends to attract
more scrutiny to ensure value formoney principles are adhered. As a result of this additionalmonitoring, agentswould
be less able to press for higher executive compensation. Finally, because many U.K. charities typically rely on funding
from the government,Wiseman et al. (2012) ownership concentration proposition that ‘the higher the ownership con-
centration, the lower the overall agent compensation in relative terms’ (Wiseman et al., 2012, p. 215) is a relevant
consideration.
Therefore, on the basis of the ‘political intervention’ and ‘ownership concentration’ dimensions of STA, we argue
that CEO compensation will be tightly monitored if the charity is more dependent on government funding. Hence,
H3: A higher reliance on government funding is negatively associated to CEO compensation.
2.5 CEO non-profit working experience characteristics and CEO compensation
STA’s cognitive framework refers to the psychological process by which a societal member makes sense of the world
in which he/she operates and this includes the relative importance that is attached to pecuniary rewards in differ-
ent cultures/contexts. In U.S. and U.K. corporate contexts for example CEO compensation is an important social com-
parator of achievements between peers, whereas in other societies (e.g. Asia and France), there are often negative
connotations associated to large executive compensation packages, resulting in far lower compensation packages for
CEOs in latter contexts (Wisemanet al., 2012). Such cognitive differences are reflective of the extent towhich financial
rewards predominate as a ‘value-metric’ in society. Instead, non-pecuniarymetrics (e.g. honorary awards and appoint-
ments, state recognition, professional recognition and reputation) take precedence over financial ones due to the pri-
macy of social, cultural and other ‘public benefit’ values, for instance in the arts, culture, poverty alleviation and health
sector. Hence,managersmay choose towork for the charitable sector due to a ‘sense of fulfilment’ (a valuemetric) and
a belief that their effortmakes a difference to others.6 In a similar vein, Jobome (2006) inferred that charity CEOsmay
be ‘sacrificing’ part of their substantive pay for altruistic reasons (p. 354) because this may be the ‘right thing’ to do.
Prior literature has partially explored the implications of the cognitive social framework by considering whether
non-profit CEO characteristics, including non-profit working experience, influence compensation (Brickley, VanHorn,
& Wedig, 2010; Jobome, 2006). However, the findings have been inconclusive for individual features such as tenure,
gender, education and experience. Other studies have associated these different characteristics, such as CEO tenure
(Brickley et al., 2010; Newton, 2015) and education (Barros & Nunes, 2007), to mainstream perspectives (e.g. agency
theory, resource dependence or notions of managerial power, entrenchment and tournament) (Chen, Ezzamel, & Cai,
6 https://jobs.theguardian.com/article/why-you-should-work-in-the-charity-sector/
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2011, Conyon, Peck, & Sadler, 2001). Yet, Jobome (2006) suggests that these CEO characteristics (such as gender, age,
tenure and qualification) are not associated to compensation in theU.K. charity sector and contends that these results
could be due to a pattern of intrinsic motives rather than extrinsic ones. The altruistic and stewardship perspective of
charity leaders may be linked to these intrinsic motives, although Jobome (2006)’s views were based on the absence
of significant results for extrinsic motivation-related variables, rather than on the presence of any intrinsic ones. This
motivates our focus on the CEO’s non-profit experience to proxy for the agent’s embedding of a culture/context that
privileges non-pecuniary rewards, altruism and the achievement of ‘public benefit’ as a value-metric. Hence, in line
with the STA’s cognitive framework, we suggest that CEOs that have worked in the not-for-profit sector will tend to
have lower compensation compared to those who joined from outside the sector.
H4: A CEO’s working experience in the not-for-profit sector is negatively associated to CEO compensation.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data and sample selection
As reported in other studies (Jobome, 2006; Perego & Verbeeten, 2015), access to U.K. charity CEO compensation
data remains challenging. Charities aremerely required to disclose the name of the CEO (Charity Commission, 2005),
the total charity staff cost and the number of employees whose emoluments fell within particular bands (i.e. from
£60,000 upwards). Because not all charities specifically disclose the CEO’s compensation, the compensation of the
highest-paid staff was assumed to be that of the CEO (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Allen &McAllister, 2018; Jobome, 2006).
Data relating to CEO characteristics and trustee board profiles were hand collected from the Charity Commission
website, charity websites and board meeting minutes, whereas accounting data were provided by the Charity Com-
mission.
This paper relies on a sample of the largest 240 charities (by total income) classified into seven main sectors.7 Due
to the limited availability and transient nature of information about charity CEOs and trustees on websites, a panel
data approach was not possible and the empirical analysis focuses on only one year (i.e. 2012). Arguably, our sample
remains sufficiently representative of theU.K. charitable sector because it represents a total income ofmore than £20
billion and accounted for more than 33% of the total income generated by charities in England andWales in 2012.8
3.2 Variable measurement
The dependent variable (CEO compensation) is measured by the natural logarithm of total compensation, which com-
prises total salary and benefits in kind (e.g. bonuses) (Allen &McAllister, 2018, Brickley et al., 2010, Newton, 2015).
In line with our hypotheses, we focus on four independent variables, namely board diversity, the presence of mon-
itoring mechanisms, funding from the government and the CEO’s experience in the not-for-profit sector. Specifically,
for H1, trustee board diversity is captured in accordancewith recommendations of the governance code (Code Steer-
ing Group, 2010) and is scored as an average sum of diversity in gender, ethnicity, education and trustee’s experience.
Similarmeasures have been used in prior studies (Kang, Cheng, &Gray, 2007;Mahadeo et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015). Each
component of board diversity, and supporting references, is summarized in Table 1.
For H2, we use an index to measure the general level of monitoring mechanisms within the board and char-
ity, following the governance code’s emphasis on the board exercising effective control and the use of internal
financial/management controls and delegation to committees (Code Steering Group, 2010). We capture monitoring
mechanisms as follows: (a) the existence of an audit committee tomonitor the charity’s finances (Charity Commission,
7 https://data.ncvo.org.uk/profile/activities/#more-data-and-research
8 http://data.charitycommission.gov.uk/default.aspx
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TABLE 1 Measures of board diversity
Board diversity index Score
a
References Variables
Gender diversity
Is there at least one female on the board?
0/1 Chen, Crossland, andHuang,
2016, Ntim, 2015
BGED
Ethnic diversity
Is there at least oneminoritymember on
the board?
0/1 Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and
Simpson, 2010
BETD
Educational diversity
Does the board includemore than one
educational background band?
0/1 Mahadeo et al., 2012 BEDD
Experience diversity
Does the board includemore than one
experience band?
0/1 Mahadeo et al., 2012 BEXD
a
0=No; 1= Yes.
TABLE 2 Measures of monitoringmechanisms
Monitoringmechanism index Score
a
Reference to prior studies Variables
Does charity have an audit committee? 0/1 Jobome, 2006 AUCO
Does charity have a remuneration
committee or nomination committee?
0/1 Jobome, 2006 RNCO
Is there any financial expertise in the audit
committee?
0/1 Jobome, 2006;Mangena and
Pike, 2005
FIEX
Is charity audited by the specialist charity
sector auditor?
0/1 Lowensohn et al., 2007 SPAU
Does charity have an internal audit
function?
0/1 Prawitt et al., 2009 INAU
a
0=No; 1= Yes.
2012); (b) the existenceof remuneration/nomination committee tohandle the appointmentof trustees andexecutives;
(c) the presence of a finance/accounting expert on the audit committee; (d) the presence of an internal audit function
(Prawitt, Smith, &Wood, 2009); and (e) whether the charity is audited by a specialist charity sector auditor9 (Lowen-
sohn, Johnson, Elder, & Davies, 2007). Refer to Table 2 for items and references.
For H3, government funding is measured by the proportion of funds received from local, central and international
aid sources divided by total income. Finally, for H4, we use a dummy variable to measure whether the CEO has had
any prior experience working for not-for-profit organizations (i.e. charity, public sector, higher education or non-
government organization) (Hamori & Koyuncu, 2015).
In addition, as suggested by NCVO (2014), in deciding the payment for senior staff, a charity may consider the dif-
ferent skills, experiences and competences the organisation needs. Therefore, other CEOcharacteristics, such asCEO
gender, ethnicity, and managerial experience, are included as control variables (Jobome, 2006; Newton, 2015). CEO
gender and ethnicity are dummy variables (Brickley et al., 2010, Newton, 2015), whereas managerial experience is
measured from one to four (Mahadeo et al. (2012), reflective of the different range of periods of work experience.
Finally, we consider organisational-level control variables, including organisational performance measured by lagged
programme ratio (i.e. proportion of charitable expenses over total charity expenditure) (Boateng, Akamavi, & Ndoro,
9 Top four ranking auditors based on number of charity clients (2009–2013), as reported by Charity Financials at http://secure.
charityfinancials.com/reports.aspx
10 NGUYEN ET AL.
2016;Callenet al., 2003); board size, charity size (i.e. total income), charity ageand sector of activities (Barros&Nunes,
2007, Newton, 2015, Perego & Verbeeten, 2015). For brevity, a summary of variables and hypothesised relationships
is shown in Table 3.
We adopt an ordinary least squares (OLS) multivariate regression approach, and themainmodel is as follows:
COMP = a1 + a2 × BDIV + a3 ×MONI + a4 × GOVF + a5 × CEON + a6 × Control variables + 𝜀. (1)
However, in order to identify which specific diversity factor of the board (Table 1) and particular component of
monitoring mechanism (Table 2) have significant impact on CEO compensation, we develop model 2, inclusive of all
the components:
COMP = a1 + a2 × BGED + a3 × BETD + a4 × BEDD + a5 × BEXD + a6 × AUCO + a7 × RNCO
+ a8 × FIEX + a9 × SPAU + a10 × INAU + a11 × Control variables + 𝜀.
(2)
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics for all our variables.10
The average CEO compensation amounts to approximately £152,000 in 2012—an increase of 42% over a decade
(2001/2002: £107,000) (Jobome, 2006). The average CEO remuneration is lower relative to U.S. NPOs (US$327,212
or the equivalent of £201,436) (Newton, 2015) but higher compared to Dutch charities (EUR95,000, equivalent of
£77,383).11 Significant variations exist within the charity sector, with the highest CEO compensation in 2012 at
£855,000. In terms of governancemechanisms, the board diversity score is 0.72, whereas themonitoringmechanisms
score is 0.65. This indicates a goodengagementwith the expectations from theGoodGovernanceCodeongender, eth-
nicity, education and experience, with almost all boards having at least one female trustee. Although charities appear
to have adopted a number of monitoring mechanisms (i.e. audit and remuneration and nomination committees), only
72.5% of audit committee boards comprise a finance/accounting expert and 32.5% of charities rely on one of the top
four specialist external auditors. Government funding accounted on average for nearly 14% of total charity income,
albeit that some charities are more heavily reliant on government. With regard to CEO characteristics, a significant
proportion (76.25%) of CEOs are male, whereas only 2.5% of CEOs are from an ethnic minority. Lastly, 68.3% of CEO
haveworked in the non-profit sector before their appointment as CEO of their current organisation.
Tables 5 and 6 provide the correlation matrix for Models 1 and 2, respectively. The results show a positive correla-
tion between CEO compensation and board diversity, whereas funding from government is negatively correlated. In
addition, the size of charity is positively correlated to trustee board diversity andmonitoringmechanisms. The results
suggest higher CEO pay for larger organizations or in the case of a more diverse trustee board. Paradoxically, there is
a positive association between CEO compensation andmonitoring mechanisms. This heightened our attention on the
role of monitoringmechanisms in relation to CEO compensation.
4.2 Results and analysis
Table 7 shows the regression results for the impact of trustee board diversity and monitoring mechanisms (model 1),
and results for specific components within each index (model 2) on CEO compensation.
10 In order to discuss Table 4 findings, compensation, assets/income and board size are expressed in absolute terms. For the regression analysis, the natural
log of these figures is used.
11 Exchange rate available at http://www.exchangerates.org.uk/historical/GBP/31_12_2012
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TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics
Variables Mean Min Max SD N
CEO_compensation
a
152.21 41.64 855.00 83.03 240
Board_diversity 0.72 0 1 0.24 240
Gender_diversity 0.97 0 1 0.18 240
Ethnicity_diversity 0.40 0 1 0.49 240
Education_diversity 0.75 0 1 0.43 240
Experience_diversity 0.78 0 1 0.41 240
Monitoring_mechanisms 0.65 0 1 0.28 240
Existence_of_audit_committee 0.83 0 1 0.38 240
Existence_of_remuneration or_nomination_committee 0.68 0 1 0.47 240
Presence_of_financial_experts in_audit_committee 0.73 0 1 0.45 240
Audited_by_Top_4_specialist_auditor 0.33 0 1 0.47 240
Existence_of_internal_audit_function 0.67 0 1 0.47 240
Government_funds 0.14 0 0.99 0.26 240
CEO_non-profit_experience 0.68 0 1 0.47 240
CEO_gender 0.76 0 1 0.43 240
CEO_ethnicity 0.03 0 1 0.16 240
CEO_managerial_experience 2.90 1 4 0.73 240
Total_assets
a
149,880 301 2,313,674 271,602 240
Total_income
a
82,956 26,693 738,502 96,432 240
Charity_age 33.18 8 54 16.20 240
Board_size 13.38 4 48 5.55 240
Programme_Ratio 0.90 0.0251 1 0.14 240
CEO_compensation-Group 1
a
151.45 65 354.4 66.85 18
CEO_compensation-Group 2
a
167.41 65 265 49.76 44
CEO_compensation-Group 3
a
219.05 75 855 195.23 19
CEO_compensation-Group 4
a
131.09 85 195 26.49 37
CEO_compensation-Group 5
a
145.89 41.64 445 66.66 43
CEO_compensation-Group 6
a
118.13 65 345 57.55 27
CEO_compensation-Group 7
a
153.14 65 485 81.23 52
a
In £000.
N= sample size.
4.2.1 Hypothesis 1: Board diversity and CEO compensation
The results from Table 7 support H1 in that charity CEO compensation is positively associated to trustee board diver-
sity. This result is in linewith STApropositions, namely that in situations involving aheterogeneousnumberof trustees,
the CEO is more likely to be compensated according to his/her ability to find compromise and manage the principals’
different concerns (Wiseman et al., 2012). Admittedly, this finding seems at odds with classical agency arguments a
more diverse board enhances the monitoring functions of the board and restrains CEO compensation (Lucas-Pérez,
Mınguez-Vera, Baixauli-Soler, Martín-Ugedo, & Sánchez- Marín, 2015). However, STA’s insights extend this agency
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TABLE 5 Correlationmatrix –Model 1
A B C D E F G H I J K L
A 1
B .17*** 1
C .17** .37*** 1
D −.13** .11* .03 1
E .01 −.05 .00 .11 1
F .09 −.06 −.11 −.07 −.04 1
G .01 −.06 −.08 .01 .09 .11 1
H .09 .17** .06 .02 −.10 .12 −.17*** 1
I −.04 −.04 −.05 .13** .16** −.04 .02 .03 1
J .08 .15** .18*** .10 .01 .03 −.02 .04 −.06 1
K .44*** .14** .21*** −.05 .07 −.07 .03 −.03 −.06 −.06 1
L .08 −.02 −.08 .05 .03 .06 .01 .02 −.08 .23*** .09 1
Note as Table 6.
thinking by suggesting that within a given social and institutional context (i.e. the U.K. charity sector), trustee board
diversitymay primarily reflect a variety of ideas and preferences from various principals (i.e. donors, beneficiaries and
government) and stakeholders (Newton, 2015; Van Puyvelde et al., 2011) onmatters of charity performance, strategy
and executive compensation (Benkraiem et al., 2017). This lack of homogeneity is translated in the agent having to
manage and political compromises between principals, and thus leading to more efforts from, and compensation to,
the agent.
We further explore whether specific dimensions of board diversity are associated to CEO compensation. The
results (Table 7—Model 2) reveal that CEO compensation is positively associated with gender diversity and educa-
tional diversity. This suggest that specific dimensions of board heterogeneity require more efforts from the CEO to
foster cohesion for strategising and decision-making activities (Benkraiem et al., 2017). This also implies that the level
of information asymmetry between principals may be more challenging when a board is gender and educationally
diverse, requiring more efforts from the CEO, and thereby leading to higher levels of executive compensation. Our
findings are also consistent with a few prior studies claiming that the diversity of the board can lead to lower levels of
managerial oversight, which in turn impacts CEO compensation (Benkraiem et al., 2017). Overall, although there may
be appreciable processual and/or outcome benefits from a heterogeneous board (Murray, 1989; Tuggle et al., 2010),
our results highlight that the pursuit of board gender and educational diversity can come at a cost, that is in terms of
higher CEO compensation (Buse et al., 2016).
4.2.2 Hypothesis 2: Monitoring mechanism and CEO compensation
The overall index for monitoring mechanisms, measured by a combination of board and organisational control sys-
tems, is not significantly associated to CEO compensation, and H2 is not supported. The results bring in question the
capability of these controls, in accordancewith Jobome’s (2006) earlier findings.When considering the role of specific
monitoring mechanisms, Table 7 suggests that the existence of a finance/accounting expert in an audit committee is
the only aspect that is negatively associated with CEO compensation. From the STA’s perspective, an organisation
with a better committee structure (financial expertise) is seen to enhance the level of intermediation and trans-
parency, which dampens agential opportunistic behaviour (Wiseman et al., 2012) as reflected in higher levels in CEO
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TABLE 7 Regression results
a
Independent variable: ln(CEO_COMP) Model 1 Model 2
Board_diversity 0.27*** (2.7)
Gender_diversity 0.31** (2.4)
Ethnicity_diversity 0.02 (0.30)
Education_diversity 0.15** (2.05)
Experience_diversity −0.02 (−0.24)
Monitoring_mechanism 0.08 (0.92)
Existence_of_audit_committee 0.12 (1.32)
Existence_of_remuneration_or_nomination_committee 0.15** (2.58)
Presence_of_financial_experts_in_audit_committee −0.21*** (−2.65)
Audited_by_top_four_specialist_auditor −0.01 (−0.01)
Existence_of_internal_audit_function 0.05 (0.95)
Government_funds −0.18** (−1.97) −0.23** (−2.43)
CEO_non-profit_experience −0.03* (−0.58) −0.04* (−0.72)
CEO_gender 0.05 (0.92) 0.04 (0.79)
CEO_ethnicity 0.02 (0.17) 0.05 (0.45)
CEO_managerial_experience
b
0.04 (1.17) 0.05 (1.58)
Programme_ratio (2011) 0.13 (0.79) 0.15 (0.88)
ln(charity_age) 0.02 (0.55) 0.03 (0.68)
ln(board_size) 0.04 (0.56) −0.01 (−0.06)
ln(charity_size) 0.24*** (7.28) 0.23*** (6.77)
Group_2 0.15 (1.53) 0.09 (0.94)
Group_3 0.13 (1.13) 0.11 (0.92)
Group_4 −0.14 (−1.43) −0.20** (−1.99)
Group_5 −0.06 (−0.55) −0.11 (−1.08)
Group_6 −0.3*** (−2.84) −0.29*** (−2.69)
Group_7 0.01 (0.08) −0.03 (−0.31)
Cons 6.84 (10.46) 6.93 (10.48)
N 240 240
F 6.94 5.78
Prob.> F 0.0000 0.0000
Adj. R-squared 29.69% 32.43%
a
Diagnostic tests (normality, linearity and heteroscedasticity checks) do not indicate any issues in relation to the data.
b
We attempted alternative tests using the actual years of managerial experience and the results are similar to our reported
findings.
***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
compensation. At the same time, our findings largely concurwith Jobome (2006) and thismay imply that the existence
of an audit committee and other control mechanisms (specialist external auditor and internal audit function) merely
represents an institutionalised phenomena of good governance with no discernible influence on CEO compensation.
STA also asserts that such instruments of transparency intermediation only provide the ‘opportunity’ for scrutiny and
our contention is that such charity monitoringmechanisms do not seem to be particularly effective.
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Finally, the positive association between the remuneration or nomination committee and CEO compensation is
noteworthy. The committee’s focus is primarily on selecting appropriate candidates and determining reward struc-
tures (Conyon et al., 2001) as well as signalling that the charity is adopting a professional approach to the search and
compensation design process (Jobome, 2006). Furthermore, the committeemay bemore adept at assessing CEO per-
formance, and arguably, it may be that constraining executive compensation is a secondary consideration. Hence, this
puts into question the view that the committee operates purely as amonitoringmechanism.
4.2.3 Hypothesis 3: Government funding and CEO compensation
Table 7 reports that government funding is negatively associated with CEO compensation, thereby supporting H3.
A higher reliance on government funding signals an increase in pressure and monitoring from the government
and its agencies, and is consistent with the STA’s notion of political intervention. In a prior study, it was found
that the reliance on government support led to reduced discretion in terms of accounting manipulation by char-
ities (Verbruggen & Christiaens, 2012). Furthermore, when NPOs have direct financial relationships with govern-
ment via grants or contracts, these often require compliance to specific terms and conditions.12 Because CEO com-
pensation is classed as an administration expense and taking into account the frequent concerns about the rise
in non-charitable expenses, CEOs may perceive that there is a higher level of oversight from government agen-
cies, thereby leading to lower agential discretion and CEO compensation (Balsam & Harris, 2014; GuideStar, 2015;
NCVO, 2014).
4.2.4 Hypothesis 4: CEO non-profit working experience and compensation
We also find from Table 7 that the CEO’s non-profit working experience is negatively associated to CEO compen-
sation.13 This result supports H4 and concurs with the view that CEOs who already work in the charity sector may
exhibit altruistic behaviours and as such, become less concerned about pecuniary rewards relative to those who have
just joined as a CEO (Wiseman et al., 2012). This result supports the previous interpretations on a CEO’s altruistic
motives in the U.K. charitable sector (Jobome, 2006). Hence, the STA’s cognitive framework on the belief, experience
and romance of leadership aswell as the value-metric of non-pecuniary rewards in the sector significantly impacts the
remuneration of CEOs who have previously worked in the sector. Admittedly, the result is only significant at the 10%
level but does hint at the relevance of social and cultural factors (i.e. charitable mission and public benefit) on CEO
behaviour towards pecuniary forms of compensation.
4.2.5 Results of control variables
Our results show that CEO compensation is not linked to organisational performance, and this confirms earlier
insights by Ballantine et al. (2008) and Jobome (2006). The pay–performance link seems to be weaker in the U.K.
non-profit context compared to the United States (Barros & Nunes, 2007; Newton, 2015). Admittedly, the results
are based on financial or accounting-based metrics due to the limited and/or challenging nature of defining common
non-financial metric for charities involved in different charitable activities. This result also reflects the limited narra-
tive disclosure of CEO compensation on charity annual reports and the absence of details of which indicators (if any)
were used to inform the compensation decisions. Charity size is found to be significantly and positively associated to
12 Diagnostic tests (normality, linearity and heteroscedasticity checks) do not indicate any issues in relation to the data.
13 https://www.ncvo.org.uk/policy-and-research/funding/what-the-research-tells-us#thecostofthecuts
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CEO compensation, and consistent with the view that CEO compensation reflects the complexity of managing large
organisations (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Hallock, 2002; Newton, 2015). Finally, the results show significant differences in
CEO compensation among charitable sectors. CEOs from social service and international charities on average receive
lower compensation than those from other sectors.
4.2.6 Sensitivity tests
Firstly, we examine whether our results remain applicable when considering the case of CEOs earning compensation
that is higher compared to the average compensation in the same charity sector (Jobome, 2006). The dependent vari-
able for CEO compensation becomes a binary variable (named as Relative pay), which is coded 1 if CEO compensation
is higher than the average in the same sector and 0 otherwise. Model 1 and 2 are re-run using a probit regression and
our results are consistent with the main tests and support H1, H3 and H4 (not reported for brevity but available on
request).
Secondly, we consider two additional proxies to measure charity performance, namely (a) fundraising efficiency
ratio (i.e. net of fundraising income and fundraising cost divided by fundraising income); (b) income growth (i.e. change
in income fromprevious year) (Boateng et al., 2016,Newton, 2015, Perego&Verbeeten, 2015). The results (also avail-
able on request) reveal similar findings, that is no significant association between organisational performance and
executive compensation. In addition, we also consideredwhether the interaction between board diversity and organi-
sational performance (measured by programme ratio) is associated to CEO compensation but therewas no significant
result.
5 OVERALL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This study sought to examine the factors associated to CEO compensation levels in U.K. charities, with an emphasis
on trustee board diversity, monitoring mechanisms and selected CEO characteristics. On the basis of a sample of 240
large U.K. charities, CEO compensation is positively associated to the diversity of the board (i.e. gender and educa-
tional background) and the existence of remuneration or nomination committee but is negatively associated to the
presence of financial experts on the audit committee. Compensation is negatively associated to the CEO’s working
experience in the non-profit sector.
Our results contribute to the limitedunderstandingof the roleof governanceandprincipal–agent relations inNPOs
(Allen & McAllister, 2018). We address some of the inconsistent findings on the determinants of CEO compensation
fromprior studies (Balsam&Harris, 2014; Barros &Nunes, 2007; Jobome, 2006; Newton, 2015; Perego&Verbeeten,
2015) by drawing upon propositions of STA (Wiseman et al., 2012). Our study is distinct from prior studies by high-
lighting how U.K. charity executive compensation levels can be theoretically informed by agency theory as extended
by three of the STA’s dimensions: ‘power relations’, ‘the institutional environment’ and the cognitive framework (Wise-
man et al., 2012). The power relations dimension suggests that in the case of charitywith a higher diversity of trustees,
the CEO is rewarded according to his or her ability to balance the trustees’ conflicting objectives and address the
information asymmetry concerns of his/her principals. In addition, and although the (residual) ownership concept is
not strictly relevant to the non-profit context, funding from government, reflective of a form of political interven-
tion and ownership concentration, constrains CEO compensation. In terms of the institutional environment, STA also
contends that the government’s transparency intermediation efforts (through accounting regulations and governance
code) mitigate agential opportunistic behaviour, therefore constraining CEO compensation. A higher level of inter-
mediation and transparency, which is characterised by the presence of finance/accounting experts on the audit com-
mittee, dampens CEO compensation levels. Finally, with regard to the cognitive framework, and in an overall context
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where altruism and intrinsic motivations are at play (Jobome, 2006), pecuniary rewards are less viewed as part of the
‘romance of leadership’ in charities, as illustrated by a negative association between the CEO’s non-profit work expe-
rience and compensation.
In the main, and although STA allows for a broader set of agency-led arguments to explain why some mainstream
governance reforms may not always operate as mechanisms of CEO control/oversight, we suggest refining Wiseman
et al. (2012) propositions in a contextwhere some principals are neither owners of the organisation nor do they derive
any financial residual in the non-profit context. Yet they steer agents in a principal–agent relationship (Van Puyvelde
et al., 2011). For instance, significant funding from a powerful principal, such as government, large social foundations
or prominent philanthropists, tends to be associatedwith lower compensation and amore attentivemonitoring of the
agent, although this may not necessitate a pay-for-performance system.
In terms of practical implications, our findings are informative to a range of stakeholders such as government, reg-
ulators, donors and sectoral representatives (e.g. NCVO). There have been recent initiatives following an enquiry
into charity senior executive pay and guidance for trustees on setting remunerations (NCVO, 2014) and our find-
ings can guide further reforms on the role of trustee boards in U.K. charities. In particular, the positive associa-
tion between the existence of remuneration or nomination committees and CEO compensation is in need of careful
consideration.
Finally, and although we robustly explored several determinants of non-profit CEO compensation in our study,
there are some limitations. There is virtually no comprehensive accounting, governance and compensation data for
U.K. charities. There is also insufficient transparency on the design of CEO compensation schemes in the United King-
domand on all charity sources of income (e.g. private donors). Therefore, an element of biasmay arise due to a reliance
on available proxies and multiple websites to collect trustee profiles. Moreover, we did not consider the role of board
interlocks, network density and more detailed composition of committees in line with the STA’s social networks per-
spective. Lastly, a review of some of the remuneration policies in recent charity annual reports reveals a substan-
tial increase in disclosures. Therefore, to build on our results, future research may consider narratives underlying
executive remuneration, the impact of board interlocks and network density and other factors (i.e. funding sources
and CEO age) on executive compensation and the explicit role of non-pecuniary rewards/achievements in the charity
sector.
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